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A B STR A C T

D espite persistent empirical support for the Marshallian model of share tenancy it
remains out of favour at the theoretical level. There appear to be two reasons for this: Firstly,
earlier attempts at theorizing an endogenous share rent under Marshallian assumptions implied
that either the marginal product of land would have to be zero everywhere or that a competitive
share rent equilibrium would fail to exist. The second objection to the Marshallian approach
has been its failure to explain why inefficient Marshallian type contracts should survive under
competitive conditions.
The aim of this paper is to develop a simple Marshallian model in which the share rent is
endogenous and which is free from these objections. It is argued that an explanation for the
persistence of ‘inefficient’ sharecropping may be that it allows landlords to appropriate a
portion of tenant surpluses even though landlords have no individual market power. Moreover,
it is shown that (for a suitable set of parameters) the inefficient share rent equilibrium would
survive competition from ‘efficient’ contracts.
The work of Cheung (1968), (1969) has inspired a revival of interest in agricultural
tenancy among economists from which two broad approaches to the theorisation o f share
tenancy have emerged. The first is the traditional or Marshallian one in which tenant choice
with respect to both the quantity of land leased and to the application of labour and other non
land inputs is unrestricted. This leads to the proposition that sharecropping is likely to be
inefficient as compared with either owner production or fixed rent tenancy because the share
rent has the effect of a tax which distorts the allocation of resources between land which is and
is not sharecropped.
The other view, pioneered by Cheung, may be termed the ‘contracts’ or ‘monitoring’
approach in which it is supposed that landlords can and will stipulate tenancy agreements with
both land and non-land inputs set at efficient levels. Hence, in the absence of other offsetting
advantages, com petition among landlords and tenants would elim inate any inefficient
Marshallian contracts and only efficient contracts would be observed.

There is a persistent trickle of evidence pointing in the direction o f the Marshallian
position. For example, Bell (1977) concluded that ‘the predictions of the Marshallian view are
generally in accord with the facts’ or more recently Shaban (1987), whose evidence indicates ‘a
strong rejection of the monitoring approach’. Despite this, the Marshallian approach remains
distinctly out of favour at the theoretical level.
However, Bell (1977) also identified a reason for the unpopularity of the traditional
approach in observing that ‘it cannot be said that the analytical foundations of the Marshallian
position inspire much confidence’. The principal aim o f this paper is to shift this perception by
suggesting a way of theorizing a competitive share rent market which is free from the objections
to the Marshallian approach alluded to by Bell.
The theoretical difficulties associated with the Marshallian approach arise because, for
the sharecropping tenant, the marginal cost of land appears to be zero — hence the tenant will
wish to lease in land up to the point where its marginal product is also zero. This has led to the
belief that either, in equilibrium, the overall marginal product of land must be zero, which is
regarded as implausible in locations such as parts o f India where sharecropping is widely
observed or that the Marshallian model must result in a persistent excess demand for land and
hence a competitive share rent equilibrium may not exist, see e.g. Newbery (1975).
In fact, theorising an endogenously determined share rent under competitive market
conditions, when agents satisfy Marshallian assumptions, i.e. tenants are free to choose the
cultivation intensity and to lease from more than one landlord, has proved curiously intractable.
The most notable attempt has been Bhardan and Srinivasan (1971) but their model is widely
regarded as unsatisfactory precisely because it implies that under a share tenancy equilibrium
the marginal product of land must be zero everywhere.1
A further objection to the standard Marshallian approach centres on its failure to identify
an economic rationale for share tenancy. For a long time it was widely believed that the
productive inefficiency of sharecropping could be offset by its superiority in terms of risk
sharing but Stigliz (1974) and Newbery (1977) have shown that sharecropping has no risk

Bell and Zusman (1976) provide a Marshallian model with an endogenous share rent but in the context
o f a market structure which is not strictly competitive.

sharing advantages over a fixed rent and wage system. Few other offsetting advantages have
been seriously proposed.2
Here it is suggested that a competitive share rent market can be theorised in a way
which meets these objections to the Marshallian approach. In particular, it is shown that under
the competitive share rent system developed below landlords may be able to appropriate a share
of the ‘surplus’ which would accrue to tenants under a fixed rent system because tenants own
non-marketed family resources. This provides a ‘rationale’ for the existence and persistence of
‘inefficient’ share tenancy. The idea that sharecropping is a means of appropriating surplus is,
of course, not new; however, what is novel here is the demonstration that appropriation can
occur even though individual landlords have no market power. Moreover, it is shown that
while the familiar Marshallian property of a zero marginal product of land holds for leased out
land this is consistent with an overall positive marginal product of land and a zero excess
demand for tenancies.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 1 outlines the main assumptions of the model
i.e. technology, existence of markets etc. Section 2 characterizes the fixed rent equilibrium
while Section 3 suggests a way of characterizing a competitive share rent equilibrium. Section
4 provides a comparison of the two equilibria in which it is shown that share tenancy may in
some circumstances provide landlords with sufficiently higher rental incomes to offset the
efficiency disadvantages of sharecropping. Finally, Section 5 considers the question of the
stability of the share rent equilibrium given that it is production inefficient and hence potentially
vulnerable to erosion by efficient contracts.

1

THE MODEL
There are two classes of household — landlords who own all the available land

according to an exogenously given distribution and tenants who are landless.3 Both types of
household own exogenously given quantities of non-land factors of production such as
household labour, draught animals etc. However, it is supposed that the only organised market
2

Basu (1989) claims that limited tenant liability in the event o f poor harvests may encourage excessively
risky production plans. This distortion of a fixed rent system would be prevented by the adoption of
share tenancy.
The possibility that tenants may also be landowners is ignored here.

yi = Gi (Hi - Hi)

i - 1 ... M (Landlords)

(1)

yj = fj (hj)

j = 1 ... N (Tenants)

(2)

where non-traded inputs have been suppressed, yj and yj are quantities of homogeneous
output, Hj is the landlord’s endowment of land, Hj is the quantity of land leased out by the ith
/
landlord and hj is the quantity of land leased in by the jth tenant. It is assumed that f. > O,
/

ft

//

G. > 0 , f . < 0 and G . < 0. Also, it is assumed that the extensive character of agricultural
i

i

J

production and the fixity of non-land inputs ensures that the marginal product of land on tenant
farms becomes zero at finite (and possibly quite small) levels o f land leased in ie. for all i and
/
for some finite hi, f. (hi) = 0.
l
Although landlord and tenant production functions are characterized as being different
this is not necessary for any of the subsequent results but is convenient for expositional
purposes. It is also convenient, but somewhat less innocuous, to assume that tenants are in fact
identical i.e. fj (hj) = f(h) and similarly landlords i.e. Gj (Hi - Hj) = G(H - H).
Finally, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty. This together with the fact that each
household’s labour supply is fixed, means that all households will seek to maximize income
subject to the market constraints they perceive. Thus, landlords will choose their leasing policy
so as to maximize the sum o f own output and rental income, while tenants will seek to
maximize output less rent.

2

A COM PETITIVE FIXED RENT EQUILIBRIUM
It is assumed that there are sufficiently large numbers of both landlords, M, and tenants,

N, for the existence of a standard competitive market in land services. Landlord and tenant
maximization then yields the conditions

G'(Hi - H) = R

(3)

f(h ) = R

(4)

where R is the market rent per acre.
A competitive equilibrium consists of H*, h*, R* and N* which satisfy (3), (4) and
also the market clearing condition
MH* = N* h*

(5)

In addition, each tenant household must earn an income at least as great as its reservation
income

Cj.

This yields

f(h*) - r* h* > cj all j = 1 ... N*

(6)

Any tenant for whom (6) is not satisfied would abandon cultivation, so the supply of tenants,
N*, is endogenous to the model and is determined by the condition:

Cj

< f(h*) - R* h* <

Ck

for j = 1 .... N* and k > N* + 1

(7)

It is clear that because of the marginal product of land is equalized across landlords and tenants
the equilibrium characterized by equations (3), (4), (5) and (7) is Pareto efficient in a
constrained sense.

3.

A C O M P E T IT IV E SH A R E R E N T E Q U IL IB R IU M
Again it is assumed that there are sufficiently large numbers of landlords and tenants for

no agent to have perceptible market power.

However, this is not sufficient to define a

competitive share rent market and the main theoretical problem lies in deciding how to model
the market constraints that agents perceive i.e. what are the market variables that agents treat as
parametric in the way that the rent per acre, R, is parametric in the fixed rent equilibrium. An
obvious candidate is the share rent, r, — this was the procedure adopted by Bhardan and
Srinivasan (1971) but it led them to the conclusion that, in equilibrium, the marginal product of
land must be zero everywhere, a proposition which is widely regarded as implausible.

The difficulty with treating the share rent as the sole parametric variable is that it does
not have the dimension of price hence, by itself, it provides insufficient

information to the

landlord on how his income will vary the quantity of land leased out. Something else is needed
and here it is proposed that in a competitive market landlords would also regard the average
product o f leased out land as akin to a market parameter.
This is justified as follows: since it is assumed that the landlord has no control over
either the quantity of land leased-in by a given tenant or over the application of non-land inputs
he has no direct means of controlling or predicting the yields on the land he leases out.
However, past experience would be a pretty good guide as to what could be expected for a
given grade of land and a given type of tenant household (both assumed to be homogeneous
here). Moreover, average yields would change only rather slowly (if at all) through time. Thus
taking one year with another the average product of leased out land is likely to be a relatively
predictable magnitude and may be used safely as a basis for calculating the return from leasing.
Taken together, the share rent and the average product of leased out land have precisely
the dimension of a price, i.e. rent per acre. Hence we suppose that the representative landlord
would choose a leasing policy so as to maximize.

G (H -H ) + r b H

( 8)

where r is the parametric share rent and b may be interpreted as the expected average product of
leased out land and which is also regarded as a parameter by landlords.
For tenants the dimensionality of r poses no problems and they simply maximize

[ 1 - r ] f(h)

(9)

These maximizations yield the following conditions for landlords and tenants respectively

G ' [H - H] = r b
f (h) = 0

( 10)

A

A

A

A

A

A share rent equilibrium is a set of H, h, r, b, and N which satisfy (10), (11) and also
A

A

A

b = b = f(h)/h

(12)
A

i.e. the realized average product of leased out land, b, must coincide with what was expected;

A

A A

MH = Nh

(13)

the market clearing condition; and finally

Ck > (1 - r) f(h) >

Cj

for j = 1 ... N and k > N + 1

(14)

which as before determines the number of tenants.
From equations (10 and (11) it is clear that, in contrast to the fixed rent equilibrium, the
share rent equilibrium is Pareto inefficient because the marginal product of leased out land is
different from that on owner cultivated land. However, unlike the model of Bhardan and
Srinvasan (1971), the overall marginal product of land can be, and in general is, positive even
though it is zero on leased land.
It is not immediately evident that a share rent equilibrium with f (h) = 0 and r < 1 will
A

always exist. However, if h is sufficiently small in relation to the available supply of land, M
H, and if there are sufficient tenants with sufficiently low reservation incomes an equilibrium
will always be possible.5

4.

A COM PARISON OF ALTERNATIVE TENURE SYSTEMS
A central problem in the debate on share tenancy has concerned the reasons why one

tenure system is chosen or emerges rather than another, since often it appears that one system

However, as is shown below, if the share rent equilibrium leads to a significantly smaller number of
tenants as compared with a fixed rent system then, even if possible, it is unlikely to be observed.

or the other is dom inant.6

A comparison of the ‘perform ance’ of the alternative systems

outlined here provides some insight on the conditions under which one or other could be
expected to dominate.
One difference has already been noted. This is that the fixed rent system is efficient
while the share rent equilibrium is not. Inefficiency is a well known property of models with
Marshallian assumptions and has led to the view that such arrangements would be eliminated by
the forces of competition e.g. Cheung (1969), Newbery (1975) and others. However, Bell
(1977) and Shaban (1987) amongst others have offered evidence which suggests considerable
support for the Marshallian view in practice. Nevertheless, there remains the problem of why
an inefficient system should persist. Here, it is suggested that an explanation may lie in the fact
that a share rent system will in certain circumstances confer distributional advantages on
landlords which lead to a collective landlord preference of share-cropping over fixed rents.
This possibility is easiest to demonstrate diagramatically.
Since households are assumed to be identical within each class, the equilibria of the two
systems may be described in terms of a representative tenant and landlord. In addition, in order
to illustrate the central point is is useful to assume, initially, that the number of tenants in the
A

fixed and share rent equilibria are the same i.e. N* = N = N. This may be interpreted as
representing an inelastic supply curve of tenants over the relevant range of net incomes. With
these assumptions there is no further loss of generality in assuming that N = M = 1, which then
enables a simple diagramatic representation of the two equilibria. This is done in figure 1.

See for example Bell (1977), Bhardan and Rudra (1980) or Bliss and Stem (1982). Coexistence of fixed
and share rent systems has come to be regarded as one of the ‘stylized facts’ regarding share tenancy
which need to be explained. However, the empirical literature suggests that co-existence is by no
means universal. Se also Byres (1983).

FIGURE 1

The total quantity of land available — owned by the landlord — is O H. The landlord’s
marginal product of land curve is the downward sloping curve G'(H - h) originating at C while
the tenant marginal product curve is f (h) originating at D.
The fixed rent equilibrium occurs at A where the marginal product of land is equated
across tenants and landlords. The equilibrium rent is OR* and the quantity of land leased out is
Oh*.

Hence the income of the representative landlord consists o f the sum o f his own

production, the area ACHh*, and rental income, the area OR*Ah*. The share rent equilibrium
A

is characterized at B, where the demand for land is Oh, which is determined by the condition
that tenants will wish to lease in land up to the point where its marginal product is zero. The
equilibrium share rent is then determined by the requirement that landlords should be just
A

A

A

A

—

willing to lease out the demanded quantity, Oh, — this requires r to satisfy r f(h)/h = G (H A

h). Landlord income is again given by the sum of own production and rental income i.e. by the
-

A

AA

A

AA

sum of the areas BCH h and OrbBh. It is clear that this exceeds (by amount R* rbBA) the
income which accrues to the landlord under the fixed rent system.
The source of the gain experienced by landlords under the share rent system is the
higher effective equilibrium rent per acre which obtains and which is at the expense of the
surpluses (over and above the reservation incomes Cj) which tenants enjoy under fixed rents.
Share cropping permits a partial appropriation of these by landlords even though individually

landlords have no market power.7 The competitive surpluses arise because of the diminishing
returns which originate from the fixity of non-traded inputs possessed by tenants, and because
of the inelastic of supply of tenants. If the latter assumption is relaxed then the advantages of
share-cropping for landlords are reduced and may be eliminated entirely since a hypothetical
switch from a fixed to share rent system would lead to some tenants abandoning cultivation
which would then result in a lower rent per acre.
To illustrate this point consider the polar case where the supply of tenants is perfectly
elastic at the reservation income c . The equilibrium of the representative tenant is shown in
figure 2.

FIGURE 2

It is evident that if a landlord did have market power (in the sense o f being able to restrict the size of
tenants’ holdings) and could discriminate in setting share rents then the whole of the competitive
surplus could be appropriated. In other words a monopolistic landlord can effectively practice perfect
price discrimination by leasing on a share rent basis and evidently some o f this ‘advantage’ is carried
over to the competitive case.

under the marginal product of land schedule must just equal c. Under the share rent system
-

a

tenants would wish to lease Oh but in order to obtain a residual income equal to c the average
AA

rent per acre must be less than OR* e.g. O rb in Figure 2. Hence landlords are clearly worse
off in the share rent equilibrium — indeed if the supply of tenants is perfectly elastic a share
rent equilibrium would never be observed if leasing on a fixed rent basis was available since
any landlord could lease all the land he wished at the competitive fixed rent OR*.8
To sum up: landlords are definitely better-off under a share rent system than under a
fixed rent one when the supply of tenants is inelastic even though the share rent system is
inefficient, and even if landlords have no individual market power. If there is some elasticity in
the supply of tenants this generates an offsetting force which tends to reduce the availability of
surpluses and the average rent per acre through the departure of some tenants. When the
supply of tenants is sufficiently elastic the competitive surpluses are effectively too small to
offset the overall inefficiency of sharecropping.

5.

THE STABILITY OF THE SHARE RENT EQUILBIRIUM
The argument of the previous section suggests a rationale for the Marshallian model

may be found in the advantages that share tenancy confers on landlords as a class. However, it
remains to be shown that the inefficient share rent equilibrium which generates those
advantages will not be undermined by competition from efficient contracts.
An efficient contract can be devised for a landlord/tenant pair under which both are
better off than in the share rent equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 3 for the representative
landlord and tenant of Section 3. The share rent equilibrium is at B, where the landlords
AA

A

rental income isO rb B h .

The assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of tenants is at the core of Cheung’s result that fixed and
share rent systems are equivalent. If the supply of tenants is perfectly elastic and if both fixed and share
rent systems are assumed to be viable then the equilibrium rent per acre must be the same under both
systems, hence the land/labour ratio must also be the same — a property which is ensured in Cheung’s
model by the appropriate contract.

A contract which allowed the tenant to lease as much land as desired at the fixed rent
AA

A

OR* plus a fixed payment of R*rbBA + e(ABh), where 1 > e > 0, would be preferred by both
A

A

tenant and landlord. The tenant would benefit by (1 - e) (ABh) and the landlord by e(ABh) —
i.e. such a contract would enable landlord and tenant to share the benefit of the increased output
which follows from removing the distortion in the allocation of land between tenant and
landlord.

FIGURE 3

The problem with this is that if all landlords offered such leases then, in a competitive
market for leases, the fixed payment or premium would be competed down to zero ie. the fixed
rent equilibrium would emerge. Thus the feasibility of an agreement between a given landlord
and tenant pair which is efficient, but offers the landlord at least the same advantage as leasing

on a share rent basis, appears to require that the share rent system continues to prevail
generally. A full analysis of such a situation can obviously be quite complicated. However, it
is clear that a landlord would have an incentive to offer such a lease either if he believes that
other landlords will not follow or, if they do, the short term gains offset the longer term losses.
On the other hand if the landlord expects that others will follow and the short term benefit is
less than the long term gain the share rent equilibrium will be stable. The following simple
model provides an example of stability. Suppose all landlords are identical, and suppose that if
any one takes advantage of a favourable short term contract then it is expected that all other
landlords will follow in the next period. Let S be the benefit (income) per period enjoyed by
landlords under the share rent system, F the benefit under a fixed rent system and S ' the one
period benefit from breaking ranks. The subjective discount factor is 8. The present value of
sticking with a share rent contract is therefore given by

I 5l S
t= l

(15)

The present value of breaking ranks in period T is:

T-l
I 8l S + 8T S' + V 8T+tF
t-l
t= l

(16)

Subtracting (16) from (15) yields

OO

8 4 S - S '] +

X ST+t [S - F]
t= l

If (17) is positive the share rent equilibrium will be stable. This is equivalent to

8 > -(S ~ S) or, if 8 = A , to i < (S - F)/(S' - S)
(S ' - F)
1+1

(17)

as the condition for stability. Thus, the share rent equilibrium would be stable unless landlords
were excessively ‘myopic’.
While not conclusive, the above example does show that stability of the inefficient
equilibrium is not impossible. Indeed, with more complex assumptions one could envisage a
situation in which a fixed rent ‘fringe’ coexited as free riders within a basically share rent
system. W here this was the case the rent per acre (exclusive of any premium) would be
expected to be lower than the average rent per acre implicit on share-cropped land. Evidence in
Bliss and Stern (1982) and Johnson (1950) suggests that where fixed rents co-exist with share
rents the rent per acre is indeed lower on fixed rent land.

CONCLUDING COM M ENTS
The model developed above is not intended to provide a comprehensive theoretical
account of sharecropping —- indeed, in practice, landlords often exercise considerable market
and non-market power in ways that are crucial to a complete understanding of actual tenancy
situations and hence the competitive model is probably inappropriate. The interest of the model
therefore lies in the demonstration that it is possible to theorise the Marshallian approach to
share tenancy in a way which is free from the objections to it alluded to by Bell (1977). The
model proposed here also lends some theoretical support to another ‘traditional’ view according
to which share tenancy is regarded as an exploitative system which enables landlords to
appropriate the surpluses of landless tenants. The significant point in this context is that share
rents provide a mechanism for appropriation even in the absence of market power on the part of
landlords.
Two final observation are worth making. Firstly, the model provides some theoretical
support for land reform. A land reform which redistributed land to tenants in amounts which
were smaller than the quantity they leased in would redistribute income in favour of tenants and
would improve productive efficiency — similarly a mandatory reduction of the share rent
would also improve efficiency and the distribution of income though in this case an excess
demand for tenancies would arise.

Secondly, one of the stylized facts of sharecropping which Stiglitz and Newbery (1979)
suggest theory should explain is the decline of sharecropping in modem developed economies.
Economic development would be expected to increase the reservation incomes o f potential
tenants as increased and more rewarding urban employment opportunities are generated — this
would shift the supply curve of tenants, as well as make it more elastic, and would reduce the
pool of rents available for appropriation by share tenancy thus over time removing the
conditions underlying for the survival of sharecropping.

APPENDIX: THE M ODEL WITH A LABOUR MARKET

When there is an organised labour it is assumed that tenants are in general net suppliers of wage
labour and landlords are net demanders of it. Hence, the landlord’s net income, c, may be
expressed as

c = G(H - H, L) + G i (H - H, L)H - G2(H - H, L)L

(A .l)

where G i is the marginal product of land, G 2 is the marginal product of labour and L is the
quantity of wage labour hired by the representative landlord. Equation (A .l) holds under both
fixed rent and share rent systems but will vary in value with the equilibrium values of H and
L. Let stars denote the equilibrium values of all variables under the fixed rent system and hats
their values under share rents. Then

c* = G(H - H*, L*) + G i (H - H*, L*) H* - G2 (H - H*, L*)L*
A

c

_

A

A

—

A A A

—

(A.2)

A A A

= G(H - H, L) + G i (H - H, L)H - G2(H - H, L)L

(A.3)

Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives the change in the net income accruing to the landlord in
moving from a fixed to share rent system.

Let G(H - H, L) = G, G i (H - H, L) = G i etc. this yields:

c - c* = [G - G*] + G i H - Gi*H * - (G2 L - L*)

(A.4)

Expanding G around (H*, L*) yields

G = G * + G i * ( H * - H ) + G2*(L -L *)

A

Using (A.5) to substitute for G in (A.4) yields

(A.5)

c - c* = [Gi - Gi*] H - [G2 - G 2 *] L

(A.6)

-

Suppose that the supply of wage labour is perfectly elastic at the wage rate w, then

A

G2

G 2 * = w and (A.6) reduces to

c - c* = [ G i - G i * ] H

(A.7)

This case is effectively the same as the no labour market case i.e. landlords will gain from a
switch to share rents provided this increases the average rent per acre i.e.

A

G i > G i*.

On the other hand if the land/labour markets in a particular locality are ‘closed’ then a
hypothetical switch of tenure system would also affect the local wage rate assuming that
tenants provide some o f the local supply of wage labour. If the local wage rate fe ll as a
consequence of the switch then from (A.6) it is evident that this would reinforce the gain
obtained by landlords.
However in general it is not possible to predict what will happen to the wage rate in this
case even if the supply of tenants is supposed to be inelastic since there are two opposing
forces at work. On the one hand a switch to share renting increases the attractiveness of wage
labour for the tenant as opposed to working on his own holding — this would tend to increase
the supply of labour to the local labour market and depress the wage rate. On the other hand,
because the marginal cost o f land to the tenant is zero under a share rent the size of tenant
holdings would tend to increase and there would be a corresponding need for extra labour to
work one’s own holding, which would have the opposite influence in the local labour market.
Thus, if a labour market is operative the share rent system may continue to generate
advantages for landlords as compared with fixed rents, though the precise circumstances in
which this is so are more difficult to pin down.
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